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I. Introduction
An extensive literature explores how agency conflicts affect contracting relationships between various firm stakeholders. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that shareholders have incentives to make risky investments that increase the value of equity, but this is done at the expense of debtholders. Subsequent literature examines how other managerial actions can transfer wealth from debtholders to shareholders (see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a survey of the corporate governance literature) and how bondholders consider the incentive structures of top management in the prices of new bonds (Ortiz-Molina (2006) ). Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2012) examine how powerful nonfinancial stakeholders (unions) can affect the contracting relationship and agency conflicts between equity and debt. Like debtholders, labor has strong incentives to keep a firm solvent because workers have substantial human capital invested in the firm. Consequently, Chen et al. (2012) find that firms with a strong union presence have lower borrowing costs ceteris paribus.
Prior research examines contracting relationships between various stakeholders and the firm in settings (typically the U.S.) that are viewed as having stable legal environments.
However, this research ignores the effect that the Government can have on these contracting relationships. Our paper examines how the contracting relationships between stakeholders can shift if there is a perceived change in the legal environment caused by government intervention. This is an important issue because the Government can influence the contracting environment when it has an interest in preferentially helping one stakeholder over others.
During the financial crisis of 2008, the U.S. Government became involved in the reorganization process of distressed non-financial firms such as Chrysler LLC (Chrysler) and General Motors (GM).
1 Given the state of the economy, the Government was concerned about the consequences in the auto sector if Chrysler was liquidated. Consequently, the Government became involved in Chrysler's bankruptcy and orchestrated a sale of Chrysler's assets to "New
Chrysler." Chrysler received a $2 billion payment from New Chrysler in exchange for its assets and used these funds to pay secured creditors' claims of $6.9 billion (payment of $0.29 per dollar of secured liability). The United Auto Workers (UAW) Trust, an unsecured creditor with a $10 billion claim for unfunded postemployment health care costs, received $1.5 billion in cash, $4.6 billion of unsecured debt, and a 55% equity stake in New Chrysler. At the time, the consensus in the popular press was that the Government's involvement in the bailout and reorganization and its support of the UAW were intended to preserve jobs. 2 While this intervention likely benefited labor and the auto sector in the U.S. more broadly, we hypothesize that the Government's intervention in the Chrysler bankruptcy harmed bondholders by unexpectedly weakening absolute priority rights in the bankruptcy proceedings. We hypothesize that the Government's intervention resulted in increased debt costs for firms with a strong labor presence because lenders of other firms perceived a weakening of their absolute priority rights or anticipated increased bargaining costs with labor in the event of distress.
We test for a change in the cost of debt for firms with a strong labor presence by examining changes in public bond prices and yields around the key events of the Government's intervention in the bankruptcy. We hypothesize that firms with similar key characteristics-high unionization of their workforce and unfunded post-employment benefits-that contributed to the 1 The Government played a similar role in the Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies. We focus on the Chrysler bankruptcy because it occurred first. Consequently, we expect the market reaction to the Government's intervention in these bankruptcies occurred primarily around the key events in the Chrysler bankruptcy.
intervention at Chrysler are most likely to experience an increase in the cost of debt if creditors perceive an increased risk of lending to firms with a strong labor presence.
We use several measures of the cost of debt. Our primary tests examine changes in public bond prices and yields in 3-day event windows surrounding key dates of the Government's intervention in the Chrysler bankruptcy. We find that more unionized firms experienced significant abnormal bond price declines and yield increases. We also find that the changes in bond prices and yields were strongest for distressed firms, consistent with bondholders being concerned about the Government's actions affecting their claims specifically in the event of bankruptcy. We obtain similar results using three alternative proxies for a strong labor presence (regulated utility firms, firms with a strike in the prior 6 years, and the absolute size of the pension obligation). Overall, our findings are consistent with the Government's intervention in the Chrysler bankruptcy increasing lenders' assessment of the risk of lending to firms with a strong labor presence, leading to a significant increase in borrowing costs for these firms.
We acknowledge that there were likely economic benefits from the Government's bailout of Chrysler that are not captured in our tests. 3 Our focus is on examining how Government intervention in the bankruptcy proceedings on behalf of labor affected the contracting relationship between other firms with a strong labor presence and their debtholders. The results of this study are intended to speak only to how one firm stakeholder (bondholders) reacted to a perceived change in the riskiness of their claims in these firms.
3 Concurrent research by Anginer and Warburton (2010) finds some (albeit mixed) evidence that bondholders of other firms reacted positively to the news that Chrysler would receive a government bailout prior to Chrysler's bankruptcy filing. Our paper differs from theirs in that we are only considering the events surrounding the actual bankruptcy (not the bailout) for which at least some bondholders perceived a change in the contracting environment because they believed that their absolute priority rights were violated.
Our findings contribute to the literature on the interaction between political and legal institutions and financial markets. Several studies find that creditor rights and political stability improve capital market efficiency and economic growth (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), (1998) , Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) , Wurgler (2000) ), reduce the cost of debt (Qi, Roth, and Wald (2010) ), improve judicial incentives (Gennaioli and Rossi (2010) ), and reduce the cost of equity (Pastor and Veronesi (2012) ). 4 The Chrysler bankruptcy provides a unique setting to test how a perceived change in the enforcement of creditor's rights affects the pricing of debt in a country with what were perceived to be generally strong creditor rights and strong legal enforcement of those rights.
This study also contributes to the growing literature on the interaction between organized labor and other stakeholders. Bronars and Deere (1991) , Perotti and Spier (1993), Matsa (2010) , and Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina (2009) document an association between capital structure (leverage and cash holdings) and interactions with organized labor. Chen, Kacperczyk, and
Ortiz-Molina (2011) document a negative relation between the cost of equity and unionization.
The study most closely related to the current paper is Chen et al. (2012) . In contrast to our findings, Chen et al. (2012) document a significant positive association between unionization and the cost of debt. We extend this literature by examining the Chrysler bankruptcy in which the Government intervenes in the relationship between secured creditors and organized labor. This alters the association between unionization and borrowing costs previously documented by Chen et al. (2012) . In the months leading up to the Chrysler bankruptcy, we find that firms with a strong union presence have lower bond yields, consistent with Chen et al. (2012) . However, we hypothesize and document results consistent with an increase in the agency conflict between creditors and organized labor around the Chrysler bankruptcy that decreases the benefit of a strong union presence on firms' borrowing costs, particularly for distressed firms. Overall, we document evidence consistent with the Government playing an important and previously undocumented role in the financial contracting relationship between organized labor and other firm stakeholders.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on political economy and labor. Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) find that the extent of labor regulation within countries is influenced by the political power held by the left. Pagano and Volpin (2005a) , create a political economy model in which managers and workers join together to support political policies that strengthen labor rights at the expense of non-controlling (outside) shareholders. Pagano and Volpin (2005b) show that labor protection will be stronger in countries with proportional voting systems because workers and controlling shareholders have more homogenous preferences. Atanassov and Kim (2009) similarly find that managers in poor performing firms sell off assets to prevent layoffs (and increase favor with workers) in countries where investor protection is weak and labor protection is strong. Our study contributes to this line of work by showing how labor-friendly government policies can affect the relationship between workers and debtholders.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II develops our hypotheses.
Section III discusses the institutional detail around the Chrysler bankruptcy. Section IV examines public bond market reactions to the key Chrysler bankruptcy events. Section V presents robustness tests and additional analysis. Finally, Section VI concludes.
II. Hypothesis Development
Prior research on the interaction between governments and financial markets such as La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( ), (1998 focuses on the effects of legal institutions on financial markets. These studies take an international perspective and view the U.S. as having relatively strong legal institutions and creditor rights. This literature finds that having strong creditor rights and consistent enforcement of those rights enhances capital market efficiency. If lenders believed that the Government's involvement in the Chrysler bankruptcy and the bankruptcy plan's success in courts increased the riskiness of their secured claims in other firms with a strong labor presence, they would demand higher returns to compensate for the increased risk. In particular, lenders could be wary of a reduction in payment received in the event of financial distress and bankruptcy. Even absent future government intervention, bondholders could view the bankruptcy as an event likely to increase the probability of a costly disagreement between unsecured creditors, specifically unions, and other stakeholders when firms become distressed. This increased likelihood of disagreement could manifest in higher legal fees during a future bankruptcy settlement and result in lower net proceeds recovered by all creditors. The expected lower proceeds in a future bankruptcy would also increase the cost of borrowing for firms with a strong labor presence. These costs will be reflected in higher yields and lower prices on public bonds for similarly situated firms. In contrast, if bondholders viewed the Chrysler bankruptcy and reorganization process as being consistent with prior bankruptcy law, we should observe no increase in yields and no bond price reaction for other similarly situated firms around the Chrysler bankruptcy.
Given that the intervention occurred during the bankruptcy and reorganization process, it is likely that debtholders will be most concerned about weakened creditor rights when a firm is close to bankruptcy. Further, firms that are close to bankruptcy are most likely to have an immediate need for secured financing to avoid bankruptcy since they are unlikely to obtain unsecured financing except on very costly terms. Consequently, an inability to obtain secured financing or the need to pay higher rates to obtain secured financing will lead to a more acute effect for distressed firms.
Because the Government intervened in the Chrysler bankruptcy and reorganization to benefit a specific unsecured creditor, the UAW, we hypothesize that highly unionized firms, particularly firms in financial distress, are more likely to face higher future financing costs due to 
III. The Chrysler Bankruptcy
In this section, we describe events impacting the likelihood that the Chrysler bankruptcy would involve payments to an unsecured creditor, the UAW, without full payment to secured creditors. Our search includes the bankruptcy filing, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, LexisNexis, and Factiva. Our dates of interest relate to the terms of payment to various creditors, not the probability of bailout or other general economic information (see Table 1 ). [Insert Table 1 around here]
We note that all the event dates focus on whether the Chrysler reorganization would involve a significant payment by Chrysler to an unsecured creditor, the UAW, when secured creditors' claims would not be fully paid, and whether the courts would accept the payout structure agreed to by the Government and the UAW. None of the events provided information to the markets about the need for the Government to bail out Chrysler since the Government began providing funding to Chrysler months prior to our first event date in December 2008.
Consequently, creditors' reactions to these events are specific to the payment structure of the Chrysler bankruptcy and to the courts' acceptance of this payment structure and are unlikely to reflect changes in investor beliefs about the need for a Chrysler bailout.
There is a debate in the law literature regarding the precedent set during the Chrysler bankruptcy. Some authors, such as Lubben (2009), argue that the bankruptcy involved a sale of assets under Section 363 of the bankruptcy code and was a non-event from a legal perspective.
Others, such as Roe and Skeel (2009) , argue that the asset sale was really a "sub rosa"
reorganization that circumvented the creditor voting requirements of Section 1129 of the bankruptcy code. They argue that the asset sale favored politically powerful unsecured creditors and was enabled by the Government's pressure on secured creditors. Several critics of the bankruptcy plan argued that the Government's involvement in the Chrysler bankruptcy would have sweeping effects on capital markets and repercussions for the historical priority structure (Bullock (2009) , Roe and Skeel (2009) ). 7 Our tests examine the bond market reaction to the Government's intervention and consequently reflect the views of creditors on the precedent set in the Chrysler bankruptcy.
IV. Publicly Traded Bonds
We begin our empirical analysis by examining short window changes in bond prices and yields for similarly situated firms around key Chrysler bankruptcy event dates. We utilize this methodology to obtain the most direct measure of the change in the cost of debt in a tight window around the key events of the Chrysler bankruptcy. This proxy for the cost of debt mitigates some concerns that any observed change in the cost of borrowing could be due to other firm-specific or macroeconomic news.
8

A. Data
We perform short window event tests around the dates presented in Table 1 . We predict that all of the identified events increased investors' perceived likelihood of a preferential payment to an unsecured creditor (the UAW).
The sample consists of all firms with bond returns from TRACE and control variables from Compustat. We eliminate firms in the auto industry to avoid supply chain effects. 9 This yields a sample of 406 unique firms, although no more than 266 firms have bonds traded on any individual event day. The sample includes 5,152 daily firm-price changes and 4,981 daily firmyield changes.
examines whether lenders required higher returns on their investments as a result of the Government intervention, regardless of the presence of a true APD.
8 This is a heightened concern during the sample period because a large amount of other economic news not directly related to our tests was released around the same time.
9 Inferences remain unchanged if we include firms in the auto industry (NAICS codes 3361-3363).
B. Public Bond Market Tests
We use the following model to test for changes in bond prices around the key Chrysler bankruptcy events:
(1) Abnormal_Bond_Return i,t = β 0 + β 1 ×Unionization i + β 2 ×Pension i + β 3 ×Gray_Area i + β 4 ×Distress i + β 5 ×Leverage i + β 6 ×MB i + ε i,t
In order to obtain the most complete sample possible and to account for differences in liquidity, trade size, and duration, we begin by following the methodology recommended by Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) . 10 Abnormal_Bond_Return i,t is the daily abnormal return (Ret i,t − Ret m,t ) on each of the 23 trading days surrounding the eight event dates listed in Table 1 (23 total days because the 3-day windows surrounding events 7 and 8 overlap).
Ret i,t is the "clean" daily value-weighted mean return, using bond price but not interest payments, on an individual firm's debt issues. We define Ret i,t as (
is the last daily trade-weighted bond price prior to day t that occurred between day t-1 and day t-
If there was no trade in the 5 days prior to the trade(s) on day t, Ret i,t is coded as missing.
Ret m,t is the daily return for the Dow Jones Corporate Bond Price Index. 11 To ensure t-statistics are not inflated due to the correlation of bond returns of multiple issues from the same firm, we perform our analysis at the firm level using the mean firm daily bond return.
In addition to abnormal bond returns, we repeat our analysis using (2009)).
We define the following variables as firm-level controls. Gray_Area, following Altman (1968) , is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms with an Altman Z-score between 1.8 and 3.
Distress is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms with a Z-score of less than 1.8. Leverage is the firm's long-term debt divided by total assets and MB is the firm's market value of equity divided by total stockholder's equity. Consistent with prior research (Perotti and Spier (1993) and Myers and Saretto (2011)), we control for leverage, market-to-book, and level of distress to reduce the likelihood that our unionization and post-employment benefit underfunding measures are capturing other risk effects at the industry or firm level.
Descriptive statistics for the bond market sample are reported in Table 2 . All independent variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Unionization ranges from 1.9% to 66.1% with a median of 7.3%. The level of unfunded pensions ranges from −23.3% (i.e., the pension is overfunded) to 100% with a median of 18.0%.
[Insert Table 2 around here] Tables 3 and 4 present the results for which the change in the cost of debt proxy is
Abnormal_Bond_Return it and Abnormal_Yield_Change it , respectively. These tests provide evidence that the market value of more unionized firms' public bonds decreased (consistent with firms' cost of debt increasing) around the key events of the Chrysler bankruptcy.
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results from equation (1), analyzing daily abnormal firmlevel debt returns (Abnormal_Bond_Return) across all 23 days surrounding the eight event dates.
Standard errors are clustered by industry and event-day, and in unreported results, by firm.
Column 1 presents the analysis without Unionization and Pension variables. In column 2, the observed coefficient of −0.011 (p-value < 0.05) is consistent with hypothesis 1A that
Unionization is negatively associated with abnormal debt returns during the eight event windows. Economically, this effect is associated with an average abnormal bond return of −12 basis points per day (−2.8% over the entire event) for a firm with the mean level of unionization.
However, the results of this test do not support our second hypothesis related to an increase in the cost of debt (i.e., a negative bond return) for firms with underfunded pension funds.
In column 3, Unionization and Pension are interacted with Distress to examine if the results are strongest in firms that are closest to bankruptcy. Consistent with hypothesis 1B, the coefficient on the interaction of Unionization and Distress is negative and significant (p-value < 0.05). In Panel B we split the sample into distressed and non-distressed firms and find a negative relation between bond returns and unionization only in the sample of distressed firms (p-value < 0.05). These findings provide further support for hypothesis 1B. The increase in borrowing costs for highly unionized firms is concentrated in the distressed firms most likely to be affected by the intervention and is not observed in relatively profitable firms that are unlikely to enter bankruptcy and are therefore unlikely to be affected by the precedent set in the Chrysler bankruptcy. The coefficients on both Pension and the interaction of Pension and Distress are not significantly different than zero.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results from equation (1) [Insert Table 4 around here]
In untabulated tests we examine the relation between bond prices, union coverage, and the underfunding of post-employment benefits on each individual event day by estimating equation (1) on each individual event date using the change in bond price, CAR i,t , as our dependent variable. We define CAR i,t as the sum of (Ret i,t − Ret m,t ) over the 3-day window surrounding each event date. We find that Unionization is statistically significant and negatively associated with abnormal debt returns on the first three event days: the date of the initial report that the UAW would receive a substantial payment from, and stake in, New Chrysler; the date the UAW and the Government reached agreement on the payments and ownership stake that would be given to the UAW; and the date that Chrysler filed for bankruptcy. Although we observe a significant coefficient for only three of the eight event days, it is the first 3 days that are significant. The preceding is consistent with lenders reacting strongly to the news when it is first released, and then not reacting upon later confirmatory news.
V. Additional Analysis
A. Unionization Data
A drawback of our methodology is that we utilize an industry-level unionization measure.
This measure has been used in the literature (see our discussion of the industry measure in Section IV.B) and alleviates endogeneity concerns around the firm's decision of whether or not to disclose the level of unionization of its workforce. To ensure the robustness of our findings, we implement a number of additional analyses. First, in Table 5 Panel A we augment equation
(1) by including industry-level control variables and running the regression at the industry level.
Specifically, we include control variables to capture the average profitability, level of leverage, and the market-to-book ratio in an industry.
Column 1 presents results including all four industry level controls in the same regression and columns 2 through 5 include each control separately. The coefficient on Unionization is negative and significant in all specifications. We do not observe a significant coefficient on
Pension. In column 6, we compute value-weighted averages for all firm-level variables and run the regression at the three-digit NAICS industry-day level (the level of our unionization data).
The coefficient on Unionization continues to be negative and significant.
Next, we hand-collect firm-specific unionization and repeat our analysis using these data.
As previously noted, the level of unionization is not a required disclosure, making it difficult to obtain a complete set of firm-level unionization data. Nonetheless, we collect these data, where available, for our sample of firms in order to provide reassurance that we are not simply observing an industry effect in our main analysis. Table 5 Panel B presents results using the hand-collected firm-level unionization data. Ideally we would like unionization rates in the U.S., since the precedent we study applies to the U.S.; but firms chose to report unionization at varying levels (if at all). In column 1, Unionization is the percentage of the U.S. workforce covered by a collective bargaining agreement. In column 2 we augment these data and add observations for Unionization measured as the percentage of the global workforce covered by a collective bargaining agreement when U.S.-specific data are not disclosed. Finally, in column 3
Unionization is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the firm states at least a portion of their workforce is unionized (whether or not they disclose a specific number or percentage of employees), and 0 if they state that they have no unions or collective bargaining agreements.
Results are consistent with our main findings across all three specifications. The coefficients on Unionization are all negative and significant (p-value < 0.05 in column 1, p-value < 0.10 in column 2, p-value < 0.01 in column 3). We also report the correlation between the firm-specific unionization data and our industry-level proxies in the last row of the panel. All three correlations are high, ranging from 0.358 to 0.693, giving further support for the use of industrylevel data.
In Panel C of Table 5 , we implement a number of alternative measures for weakened creditor rights. Specifically, regulated firms, unionized firms in which organized labor has higher bargaining power, and firms with large defined benefit (DB) pension plans (as opposed to their funding status). We expect an increase in the cost of debt around the Chrysler bankruptcy for regulated firms-those in the utility industry (NAICS-22)-because these firms tend to be highly unionized and deeply intertwined with the government. Both of these factors could lead creditors to perceive a heightened decrease in their creditor rights. Column 1 presents results using an indicator variable, Utility, set equal to 1 for utilities firms and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on
Utility is −0.007 and significant (p-value < 0.01), consistent with a decrease in bond prices and increased borrowing costs for these utility firms.
We also expect an increase in the cost of debt around the Chrysler bankruptcy for firms in which organized labor has higher bargaining power. We proxy for increased labor bargaining power using an indicator variable, Strike, coded as 1 for firms that have experienced a strike within the previous 6 years and 0 otherwise. In column 2 we observe a significant negative coefficient of −0.004 (p-value < 0.01) on the strike indicator variable, consistent with a decrease in bond prices and increased borrowing costs for firms in which labor has high bargaining power.
Finally, we expect an increase in the cost of debt around the Chrysler bankruptcy for firms with larger DB pension plans. This proxy has two desirable characteristics. First, firms with large DB plans are more likely to be unionized (with a correlation of 0.17), and the pension obligation, unlike unionization, is a required firm-specific disclosure. Second, although Pension captures the current funding status of a firm's pension plan, the total obligation could be a better measure of the possibility of significant future underfunding. We use the variable Pension_Obligation, coded as reported pension obligation scaled by total assets, as a proxy for the size of the defined pension plan. In column 3 we observe a significant negative coefficient of −0.005 (p-value < 0.10) on the DB plan size variable, consistent with a decrease in bond prices and an increase in borrowing costs for firms with large DB pension plans.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
B. Airline Carrier Case Study
We also document the effect of the intervention in the Chrysler bankruptcy in the highly unionized airline industry in which a majority of firms disclose unionization data. 17 For this subsample we hand-collect unionization data from 10-K filings. One major U.S. passenger airline, JetBlue Inc., is non-unionized, while its primary domestic competitors (United Airlines, Delta Airlines, Southwest Airlines, US Airways, Alaska Air, and American Airlines) are all highly unionized (73% on average).
Consistent with hypothesis 1, in Figure 1 we observe that JetBlue's bonds outperformed each of its competitors over our 23-day event window. In addition, we also examine foreign unionized airlines because we predict these firms will be less affected by any change in U.S.
bankruptcy rules or precedent than their domestic counterparts, but they will be affected by other news specific to the airline industry. Consistent with hypothesis 1, we observe that bonds of major unionized foreign carriers (Air Canada, Air France, SAS Airlines, Singapore Airlines, Cathay Pacific, Lufthansa, and Qantas Airlines), as measured in their domestic currencies, outperform domestic unionized carriers over our 23-day event window. These anecdotal findings provide further support for our hypothesis that unionized firms experienced an increase in the cost of borrowing and that the increase in the cost of borrowing in our main analysis is not simply due to unobserved industry effects.
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 17 A series of papers by Benmelech and Bergman (2008) , (2009) 
C. Monte Carlo Simulation
The event of interest in this study occurred during a volatile period in the economy. The focus on short-window returns provides reassurance that the Government intervention in the Chrysler bankruptcy is driving our findings and not some other event that occurred around the same time period and/or a time trend in the underlying data. In order to further rule out that we are simply capturing an overall time trend in the relation between unionization and the cost of debt, we perform 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations, randomly choosing 23 pseudo-event days during the 2-year window surrounding the Chrysler bankruptcy and rerunning equation (1). Table 3 column 2 (denoted with a line in Figure 2 ) was less than the observed estimated coefficients in all of the 10,000 random draws. This is consistent with our event study results picking up bondholders' reaction to the Government intervention specifically rather than some other event that occurred around the same time period and/or a time trend in the underlying data.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
D. Alternative Proxies for Distress
We also repeat our analysis using five alternative proxies for distress to explore the robustness of our findings to using alternative measures of distress; we present the results in Table 6 . The dependent variable is Abnormal_Bond_Return as defined in Table 2 . We use the following alternative measures of distress: in Column 1, Distress is the distance to default measure of Fong, Hong, Kacperczyk, and Kubik (2012) (leverage×equity return volatility) set equal to 1 for firms above the median and 0 for firms in the bottom quartile; in Column 2,
Distress is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms with junk rated debt, and 0 for firms with investment grade debt; in Column 3, Distress is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms in the top tercile of the naïve distance to default measure of Bharath and Shumway (2008) , 0 otherwise;
in Column 4, Distress is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms in the top tercile of the Ohlson (1980) bankruptcy score, 0 otherwise; in Column 5, Distress is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms with an interest coverage ratio below 1, 0 otherwise. We find a negative and significant interaction between unionization and distress for three of the five alternative distress measures (columns 1, 3, and 5) and the remaining two interactions are not statistically significant. While these results are somewhat mixed, overall they are consistent with the finding that the increase in borrowing costs (negative bond returns) for more unionized firms around the Chrysler bankruptcy is particularly strong for distressed firms.
[Insert Table 6 around here]
E. Alternative Proxies for Borrowing Costs
We repeat our main analysis using two alternative proxies for increased borrowing costs: change in equity prices and change in credit default swap (CDS) spreads around key Chrysler bankruptcy events. The hypothesized increase in debt borrowing costs should eventually flow through to equity holders as the residual claimants of the firm (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Stulz and Johnson (1985) ). The increased borrowing costs should also be reflected in CDS spreads. CDS spreads measure default risk as well as the expected losses in default because the CDS contract pays the difference between face value and the actual value received. In addition to being an alternative measure to the cost of debt, CDS spreads have the added advantage of illustrating the role of distress in our hypothesized effect. CDS spreads are jointly determined by the likelihood of bankruptcy and the expected costs within bankruptcy. We predict the likelihood of receiving less in bankruptcy as a result of this event would cause CDS spreads to increase around the event days, especially for firms close to bankruptcy.
Using equity returns as the dependent variable, we observe a negative and significant coefficient on Unionization (p-value < 0.01), consistent with our first hypothesis. Under this specification, we also find evidence of a negative association between firms' unfunded postemployment benefits and abnormal equity returns around event dates (p-value < 0.05), consistent with our second hypothesis. When examining CDS returns we observe a significant positive coefficient (the predicted sign) on the level of unionization (p-value < 0.05) but do not observe similar support for our second hypothesis on Pension.
F. Long-term Effects
In addition to the short window event tests, we provide evidence on the longer-term Figure 3 , we observe an increase in the bond yields of more highly unionized firms consistent with our findings. This increase in bond yields for highly unionized firms is sustained through the end of the year, suggesting that the effects of the Government's intervention on bond pricing of highly unionized firms lasted longer than just the period of time immediately surrounding the bankruptcy.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
Second, in untabulated results we also examine the spreads on newly issued private loans using a difference-in-difference methodology, following Santos (2011) , in the year prior to and the year following the events outlined in Table 1 . This analysis allows for a direct estimate of the non-temporary changes in the cost of debt experienced by firms in highly unionized industries and firms with large unfunded pensions relative to their peers and also to control for known determinants of loan spreads. 18 These unreported results are consistent with both hypotheses: loan spreads of highly unionized firms and loan spreads of firms with highly unfunded pensions increased by 62 and 43 basis points, respectively, following the Chrysler bankruptcy.
G. Alternative Explanations
One concern with our findings is the possibly remote likelihood of the events that lead to the Government's intervention in Chrysler's bankruptcy being repeated in the future. As discussed by Roe and Skeel (2009) , the Chrysler bankruptcy is now a part of case law, and the legal precedent was used very shortly afterward in the bankruptcy of General Motors. If investors expect the secured debt of firms with politically powerful unsecured claims to be riskier due to this change in legal precedence, the hypothesized increase in firms' cost of debt will exist even without direct Government intervention in future bankruptcies. In addition, this legal precedent increases the bargaining power of unions relative to secured creditors by increasing the anticipated legal and negotiating costs to secured creditors in financial distress 18 Our sample of 287 new loans is obtained from Dealscan. We control for whether the loan is investment grade, whether it is secured, the spread between investment grade debt and treasury yields at origination, financial distress, leverage, the market-to-book ratio of the issuer, and industry and time fixed effects. We thank Michael Roberts for providing a Dealscan-Compustat link file. We also eliminate firms in the auto industry to avoid supply chain effects of the Chrysler bankruptcy. Inferences remain unchanged if we include firms in the auto industry (NAICS codes 3361-3363).
(even absent future Government intervention). The precedent set during the Chrysler bankruptcy could be viewed as strengthening a union's negotiating position relative to other creditors.
Another alternative interpretation for the results is that debtholders expected to be bailed out by the Government and were disappointed that they did not receive more bailout funds.
Under this interpretation, the negative abnormal returns we observe simply represent secured creditors' surprise at not receiving a larger payout from the Government. However, this does not explain why the increase in bond yields for more unionized firms persists for several months after the economy began to improve and the government was no longer handing out TARP funds. Further, this argument applies specifically to the price of Chrysler debt but our tests examine the debt of a much larger sample of firms. For this argument to explain our results, debtholders of firms not already in bankruptcy would need to expect a bailout from the government even though they did not yet need to be bailed out.
VI. Conclusion
A large body of literature beginning with Jensen and Meckling (1976) examines how agency conflicts between various stakeholders impact firms' contracting relationships with these stakeholders. Much of this literature assumes that a relatively stable contracting environment exists within the U.S. We use the setting of the Chrysler bankruptcy to examine what happens when government incentives to help one stakeholder can change the contracting relationships between various firm stakeholders. Prior research by Chen et al. (2012) finds that the overlap between unions' incentives and bondholders' incentives to keep firms solvent leads to a lower cost of debt for firms with a relatively strong labor presence. Our findings suggest that this relation between lower borrowing costs and a strong labor presence can change in settings when bondholders fear that government incentives to benefit labor conflict with bondholders' incentives to maximize the value they receive in bankruptcy. Our findings are robust to using several alternative definitions of the strength of labor's presence in a firm and to using alternative measures of the cost of borrowing.
As a caveat, we note that our tests solely examine whether the cost of debt increased for other firms as a result of the Government's intervention specifically in the Chrysler bankruptcy.
This is independent of the Government's stated reasons for bailing out Chrysler or whether bailing out Chrysler was desirable from a policy perspective for other reasons. We acknowledge that there may have been broader economic benefits from the Government's bailout that are not captured in our tests. Overall, this study suggests that the Government is an important, though sometimes ignored actor in the contracting relationship between various firm stakeholders.
FIGURE 1 Airline Event Bond Price Changes
This figure presents bond price changes of JetBlue (a non-unionized carrier), the average bond price changes of domestic unionized airlines (United Airlines, Delta Airlines, Southwest Airlines, US Airways, Alaska Air, and American Airlines), and the average bond price changes of foreign unionized airlines (Air Canada, Air France, SAS Airlines, Singapore Airlines, Cathay Pacific, Lufthansa, and Qantas Airlines) over the 23-day, eight-event window.
FIGURE 2 Monte Carlo Abnormal Bond Returns Unionization Coefficient Estimates
This figure presents a histogram of the Unionization coefficient estimates obtained through Monte Carlo methods; the solid vertical line represents the actual event Unionization coefficient. Coefficients were obtained through 10,000 random draws selecting 23 pseudo-event days in the 2-year window surrounding the Chrysler bankruptcy and estimating the same regression specification as presented in Table 3 , Column 2. The actual coefficient estimate (−0.011) was less than all 10,000 pseudo-estimates.
FIGURE 3 Weekly Abnormal Bond Yield Estimates
This figure presents a plot of the ordinary least squares coefficient estimates on unionization from equation (1) give the Chrysler union retiree health care trust more than 20% of "New Chrysler" and make it "the single-largest stakeholder in the automaker" (Vlasic (2009) ). The deal is made prior to any deal being made with secured lenders. have not carried that burden to justify such an action. The court's action was not a decision on the merits of the underlying legal issues" (Vicini (2009) Panel A presents the main regression results including industry-level controls (columns 1 through 5) and run at the industry level (column 6). The dependent variable in all specifications is Abnormal_Bond_Return and is defined as the daily abnormal return on each of the 23 trading days surrounding the eight event dates described in Table 1 . Industry_ROA is the three-digit NAICS industry average of income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets (IB/AT).
Industry_ROE is the three-digit NAICS industry average of income before extraordinary items scaled by book value of equity (IB/SEQ). Industry_Leverage is the three-digit NAICS industry average of long-term debt divided by total assets. Industry_MB is the three-digit NAICS industry average of market value of equity divided by total stockholder's equity. Panel B presents results using firm-level Unionization (Column 1, Unionization is the percentage of the U.S.
workforce covered by a collective bargaining agreement; Column 2. Unionization is the percentage of the global workforce covered by a collective bargaining agreement when U.S. specific data is not disclosed; Column 3. Unionization is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the firm states at least a portion of their workforce is unionized, and 0 if they state that no workers are unionized or covered by collective bargaining agreements). Panel C presents results using alternative proxies for firms expected to face higher future borrowing costs. Utility is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms in the utility industry (NAICS-22).
Strike is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm that have experienced a strike within the previous 6 years. Pension_Obligation is the firm's reported pension obligation divided by total assets. All other variable definitions are presented in Table 2 . Continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Industry Effects are fixed effects and are coded at the two-digit NAICS level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-industry error correlation. ***, **, and * are reported for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Fong et al. (2012) (leverage×equity return volatility) set equal to 1 for firms above the median and 0 for firms in the bottom quartile; Column 2, Distress is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms with junk rated debt, and 0 for firms with investment grade debt; Column 3, Distress is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms in the top tercile of the naïve distance to default measure of Bharath and Shumway (2008) ; Column 4, Distress is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms in the top tercile of the Ohlson (1980) bankruptcy score; Column 5, Distress is an indicator variable equal for 1 for firms with an interest coverage ratio below 1). The dependent variable in all specifications is Abnormal_Bond_Return and is defined as the daily abnormal return on each of the 23 trading days surrounding the eight event dates described in Table 1 . All other variable definitions are presented in Table 2 .
Continuous variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Industry Effects are fixed effects and are coded at the two-digit NAICS level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-industry error correlation. ***, **, and * are reported for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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